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ABSTRACT 
The transition process that started in the Balkans some twenty years 
ago, and the European association process to which it has been 
inexorably connected, has led to a radical transformation of the Balkan 
economic space across local, regional, national and trans-national 
levels. Amongst the other effects that this have had, was the emergence 
of new and acute socio-economic dichotomies (polarisation) and 
problems of persistent underdevelopment, peripherality-rurality and 
economic dependence. In this paper we review the policies that have 
been applied to address these issues and examine the relevance of 
contemporary concepts of local economic development for the 
mobilisation of cohesive and sustainable development in the Balkans. 
We examine how the main elements of the new regionalist 
developmental strategy relate to the basic dimensions of socio-spatial 
infrastructure in the Balkans and identify the key weaknesses of the 
latter. We conclude by proposing a wider regional strategy that will be 
able to resolve the existing deficiencies by means of a regional 
cooperation approach that will seek to maximise intra-regional synergies 
and develop local and regional comparative advantages and the 
provision of similar public goods 
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Local Sustainable Development and Spatial Cohesion in the 
Post-transition Balkans: in search of a developmental model 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years the transition economies of the Balkans have 
experienced an unprecedented process of crisis and transformation. Together 
with the well-studied implications that this process had at the national level, on 
aspects of governance, demography, societal organisation and the economy, a 
significant but much less studied transformation has occurred with regards to 
the spatial organisation of these economies. The dual process of transition and 
European accession has altered radically the spatial organisation of the 
economy, leading to combined experiences of economic decline, rising 
inequality and polarisation. An immense concentration of human and physical 
capital in the main urban centres, coupled with a wider trend of de-
industrialisation in the periphery and the collapse of ‘enterprise space’ (of one-
factory towns – monoculture economies) has created urgent problems of local 
development and spatial cohesion. In the absence of a strong tradition for 
regional and local development policy and under the pressures emanating from 
EU conditionality and the urgent need for (national) economic development, 
attempts to address issues of sustainable development and economic cohesion 
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at the local, urban and regional scales have been at best limited.  
Importantly, the limited efforts to address such problems have for their largest 
part concentrated on traditional concepts of regional development relating to 
infrastructure provision and redistributive transfers (Petrakos, 2002; Hughes et 
al, 2004; Monastiriotis, 2008a; Bartlett, 2008). Rather naturally, little attention 
has been paid to ideas and concepts deriving from relatively recent 
contributions in the literature of local and sustainable development, including 
concepts of cultural distinctiveness, local knowledge, regionalism, and 
functional-spatial connectivity. Such concepts, although developed effectively 
to address developmental issues in other contexts (especially in less well-off 
areas of the European ‘north’), may be much more pertinent to the case of the 
ailing localities and regional economies of the post-transition Balkans, where 
the pressures of inter-regional competition and the challenges of economic 
polarisation are much more immediate.  
In this paper we engage in a preliminary but extensive discussion of the 
relevance of contemporary concepts of local economic development for the 
Balkan countries. Our point of departure is the uniqueness of the challenges 
faced by the region, both in terms of the processes that are taking place there as 
well as in relation to the policy options that the region faces for its local 
development strategy. On the one hand, the process of transition has been 
significantly more complex and cumbersome in the Balkans than elsewhere in 
Europe. The complexity of the wars in former Yugoslavia and of state-building 
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led to a multifaceted, delayed and ‘distant’ process of transition (Kuzio, 2001; 
Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 2008) – which has been made more complex under 
the EU association process and the actions on supranational regionalism that it 
has required. The process of differentiated integration that is taking place in the 
region (Economides, 2008) has made the transformation of the local economies 
both more painful and slower and has spurred antagonisms (‘race to accession’) 
thus hindering the very fundamentals of regional cooperation. It should be 
noted that all this is happening in a relevant vacuum of a historical tradition in 
regional policy and a general caution against localism, which is naturally 
perceived to be opening up to potential secessionist claims. On the other hand, 
these inherent problems to designing and deploying a successful local 
development strategy come to add to existing questions about the usefulness of 
regional (cohesion) policy at large, in a context of relative underdevelopment, 
where regional transfers may well hinder national growth and where local 
potentials may be insufficient to stand up to the requirements of traditional 
models of indigenous development.  
To address these issues, we first review briefly the patterns of inequality, 
backwardness and polarisation in the post-transition Balkans and locate the 
wider national, regional and supranational processes that contributed to these. 
We then examine the relevance and effectiveness of traditional national and 
regional policies and interventions and investigate alternative strategies and 
policies for local economic development. In doing so, we ask what do concepts 
such as new regionalism, polycentricism, local distinctiveness, etc., imply for 
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spatial cohesion and local economic development in the Balkans; how is the 
Balkan spatial structure and ‘dual transition’ limiting the relevance and 
applicability of these concepts; and, finally, what is the way forward (and out) 
in terms of policy recommendations for local economic development in the 
region?  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we look at the main 
characteristics of the Balkan economic space, examining the spatial problems 
and characteristics of the local economies in the region as well as the spatial 
and regional policies that have been applied there. In section 3 we turn to 
theory and make some critical observations about the processes of spatial 
cohesion and local sustainable development, as they relate to existing 
theoretical and applied approaches. Section 4 presents our analysis of the 
interaction between local problems and proposed solutions, examining the 
relevance of what we indicatively label as ‘new sub-national regionalism’ for 
the Balkan context. The final section concludes with some thoughts about the 
possibility on the development of an integrated spatial-regional policy for the 
Balkans. 
 
2. Spatial cohesion and regional disparities in the Balkan economic 
space 
Despite their differences, in terms of size, stage of relations with the EU, 
degree of internationalisation and level of development, almost all of the 
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transition countries in the Balkans face a series of common characteristics in 
relation to their spatial and regional problems. All countries have seen a notable 
process of spatial polarisation and a strengthening of the primacy of the main 
(often a single) metropoles. This is evidenced in the very steep rank-size rules1 
that characterise the spatial distribution of their population, with capital cities 
being often three or even five times larger than the second largest city (Petrakos 
et al, 2005; Arvanitides and Petrakos, 2008), but more importantly in the 
economic disparity that emerges between these capital cities and the regional 
peripheries – with disparities in total local GDP being often many times larger 
than in terms of population (Monastiriotis, 2008a). For the smaller states in the 
region, this signals a clearly worrisome development of city-state formation, 
where the whole national periphery integrates into a homogenous hinterland 
servicing almost exclusively the national centre (Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 
2008). In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe this trend has to some 
extent been ameliorated due to the development of another dichotomy, namely 
the development of border regions which are adjacent to more developed 
European countries. In the Balkans these effects are much weaker – although 
still partly identifiable. Potentially, these can create yet another disparity of 
east-west peripheries.  
Underneath these patterns that characterise the macro-geographies of these 
countries, other patterns of disparity emerge at the more localised level. Due to 
long-standing trends of depopulation and concentration in the centres, 
                                                 
1
 This is less so in countries such as Albania and Montenegro, perhaps due to their relative 
backwardness. The trend there too, however, is clearly towards increased polarisation.  
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disparities tend to become much localised. In some countries as much as three 
quarters of cross-regional disparities are located within very small areas (below 
the NUTS3 level), resulting in very weak patterns of geographical 
concentration and thus of potentials for generating and exploiting 
agglomeration and specialisation economies and spillovers. This reflects and 
reinforces another characteristic of the Balkan economic space, namely the 
very weak spatial connectivity at the local, regional and cross-national levels. 
Evidence for Bulgaria suggests that spatial spillovers are negligible 
(Monastiriotis, 2008a), while similar is the picture obtained from information 
concerning commuting patterns across the region (ETF, 2005; CPESSEC, 
2009) and productivity spillovers emanating from FDI firms (Monastiriotis and 
Alegria, 2009). In the absence of such linkages and spillovers, issues of local 
economic development and spatial cohesion become particularly complex 
while the continuing trend of polarisation becomes particularly difficult to 
tackle.  
As a consequence, policy for local economic development and spatial cohesion 
in the region faces a number of acute challenges. These concern not only the 
patterns described above (of polarisation, weak connectivity, and the 
geographical scale of economic disparity), but also a number of other 
exogenous and endogenous factors. One such factor concerns the spatial 
allocation of resources. The patterns of out-migration and peripheral 
depopulation (urbanism) clearly need to be reversed. It is less clear however if 
similar efforts should be placed with regards to the spatial allocation of capital. 
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The spatial concentration of FDI and of domestic investment in the capitals 
may be extremely important for the development of agglomerations and thus 
for national development, even if this is at the expense of spatial (and thus also 
social and economic) cohesion. Another factor concerns the level and quality of 
infrastructure, not only physical, but also human and social. Connecting places 
is clearly important (but costly), but perhaps more important is to develop 
locally the skills (human capital) and attitudes (entrepreneurship) that can 
support the development of centripetal forces and diffusion effects emanating 
from the developing agglomerations in the metropolitan centres. For this, a 
third factor is clearly important, namely coherent and efficient forms of 
governance, both at the regional and central levels. The patterns of 
decentralisation that have prevailed, partly as a response to EU pressures, have 
often led to local antagonisms and counter-productive competition between 
localities (Brusis, 2002; Hughes, et al., 2004) – while the administrative 
division of space that has resulted (again, in response to EU and Eurostat 
pressures) has little resemblance (and relevance) to the economic division of 
space and the underlying economic geographies of each country. Given its 
distance from the large European markets, these factors act to reinforce the 
economic duality and peripheral underdevelopment that characterises 
effectively the whole of the Balkan economic space.   
In this context, the mixture of national, regional and spatial policies that have 
been applied in the Balkans shows a number of deficiencies and limitations. 
First is the focus and design of centralised policies for national development. 
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Almost invariably, in all countries these seem to prioritise on economic 
restructuring and national growth. While this is understandable, given the acute 
needs for national convergence, it happens however at the expense of regional 
convergence and cohesion as it clearly favours concentration into a single 
agglomeration, normally around the capital. Moreover, the developmental 
strategy that is being pursued, focusing on the speedy internationalisation of the 
national economies (EU association/accession, WTO membership, etc) exposes 
the less developed regions within the national economies to acute competition. 
A strategy that would be focusing more on the development of cross-regional 
comparative advantages and the provision of relevant public goods would be 
more appropriate for the balanced development of the Balkan economic space 
(Monastiriotis, 2008b; Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 2008), but this is often seen 
as (and in some respects it probably is) antagonistic to the objective of the 
European perspective of the region, at least in the short-to-medium run. In this 
context, any initiatives for regional cooperation obtain a skewed form, targeting 
not the development of regional public goods and synergies but rather servicing 
the European objective. For example, the development of transport 
infrastructure obeys more the logic of the European Corridors than the actual 
needs for intra-regional connectivity.  
On the other hand, regional policies targeting specifically regional development 
and convergence also exhibit some inherent limitations. An important factor 
here, besides the apparent subordination to national economic objectives, is the 
role of ethno-political considerations in the design and implementation of 
  9 
policies. This is most emphatically evidenced in the case of Bosnia, where 
developmental strategies and economic links are still developing across ethnic 
lines, clearly hindering the organic integration of the country’s economic space. 
Another important constraint comes from the fact that in most cases the model 
for regional policy employed emulates rather uncritically the EU model of 
financing2 (co-financing, subsidiarity), which in the Balkan context favours 
effectively the more developed regions (as these are the ones that possess the 
necessary capacities and resources to benefit from the available funds) and thus 
results in less redistribution than would be needed or intended. The model of 
decentralisation and administrative division of space that has been adopted 
under the EU association process produces inconsistent geographies and 
conflicts between the various tiers of governance. For example, funding for 
investment projects is administered at the NUTS2 level but planning for 
regional development is at the regional level (NUTS3) while the design of 
projects is at the local level. While this policy model may be suitable for the 
backward regions of France or Germany, it has clear limitations for the 
backward regions of countries such as Serbia or Albania.  
A third factor relates to the weak appreciation of the nature of regional and 
local developmental problems facing the countries in the region. Research on 
issues of spatial cohesion, economic backwardness and regional interactions is 
                                                 
2
 This is not only due to external constraints (e.g., EU conditionality) but also due to internal limitations 
(Monastiriotis, 2008a). The absence of a tradition in national regional policy has resulted in the 
importation and transposition of the EU model for regional development into a national model for 
regional development without the development of a parallel national policy for regional development, 
as is the case in the old Member States of the EU.  
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unsurprisingly limited in the region and thus also limited is the understanding 
of the true nature of the regional problems and of the appropriate solutions that 
should be favoured. This is further hindered by the limited historical and 
institutional capacities of the relevant administrations (Ministries for Regional 
Development, Regional Development Agencies, etc). As a result, the objectives 
of regional policy are in most cases not well defined: they remain abstract and 
sometimes conflicting, showing little engagement with the processes that are 
essential for balanced local economic development, such as diffusion effects, 
spatial linkages and spillovers. Consequently, policy interventions are often ad 
hoc, unconnected and largely ineffective.  
Similarly, spatial policies (targeting spatial cohesion and balanced 
development) also appear to emulate uncritically models that have been 
developed for different spatial contexts. A trend towards polycentricism for the 
development of a system of cities is evident in some countries, especially in the 
Eastern Balkans, but this is largely done without a solid basis for the 
development of economic linkages. Spatial planning is often done 
independently of area designation and zoning, thus producing more 
inconsistencies and further differentiation. Last but not least, throughout the 
region there is very little effort to produce a spatial planning system that will 
run across national borders and thus address jointly the problems of 
polarisation, unconnectedness and peripherality that characterise the whole of 
the region. Ethno-political conflicts (e.g., Kosovo, Bosnia), territorial 
disintegration (Serbia, Montenegro) and policy differentiation (east-west 
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Balkans) are characteristics that affect directly the design and implementation 
of regional and spatial planning policies and limit their effectiveness.  
In summary, the deployment of a coherent and effective regional policy in the 
region faces significant challenges and problems. Problems of peripherality, 
polarisation and underdevelopment are acute but the policy responses are 
largely constrained by both internal weaknesses and external constraints. The 
processes of transition and European integration may appear to be supportive 
for the design of new policies, but they largely constrain the extent to which 
policy can prioritise on regional convergence as well as the basis (and scale) on 
which the design and delivery of policies can be implemented. The process of 
transition favours concentration of economic activity and centralisation of 
political power, while it pushes towards a prioritisation on national objectives 
at the expense of regional convergence. The process of European association 
pushes on the one hand towards the adoption of a policy model that is alien to 
the Balkan context and to the local developmental needs and capacities, while 
on the other hand subordinates further the regional developmental objectives to 
the national objectives for internationalisation and European integration. 
Structural weaknesses are also present, including the weak human and financial 
capital and the destructive consequences of deindustrialisation; the limited 
socio-cultural infrastructure relating to entrepreneurialism, a participatory 
culture, and civil societies; the similarly weak public administrations and 
financial capacities; the tradition of statist corruption and clientelism; and the 
absence of a tradition for regional policy, which is in some cases coupled with 
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an aversion by the localities to ‘central planning’ and by the central 
administration to localism. All these problems call for a radical reconsideration 
of the spatial developmental strategy for the whole of the region. In the next 
two sections we offer a preliminary approach to this, first examining the range 
of concepts and policy tools that have recently gained currency in the regional 
development literature and then by examining how these relate to the 
specificities and limitations of the Balkan context. 
 
3. Concepts for regional and local economic development 
Traditional regional development theory places elevated emphasis to external 
stimuli for the promotion of regional development. Thus, public investment in 
infrastructure (supported by the central administration), incentives for the 
attraction of private investment (through area designation, tax breaks, etc), and 
measures to stimulate external demand (e.g., through technological upgrading 
or advertising and export promotion) obtain a central role for regional 
development (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). The main objective here is a 
redistributive one, namely to direct economic activity to ailing regions. This is 
largely a top-down policy approach, reflecting the belief that regional 
development is the responsibility (and competency) of the state. In this context, 
regions are in one way or another in direct competition (for resources) with 
each other – but they are otherwise isolated from one another: spillovers are 
largely seen as either detrimental or secondary. Indeed, regional growth is seen 
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in this approach as the regional equivalent of national growth, with little 
emphasis being placed on connectivity, interdependencies and spillovers. In 
this context, significant questions about the usefulness of regional policy can, 
and have, been raised not least by the literature of regional convergence (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1991) which is inspired by the neoclassical growth model, 
but also by other equilibrium approaches such as those deriving from the 
Harris-Todaro model of urban unemployment (in development economics) or 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of factor price convergence (in international 
trade theory). Critiques to regional policy emanating from such literatures 
identify significant policy failures having to do with deadweight loss, adverse 
incentives, economic distortions, aid dependency and the like.  
Given these concerns, and often the apparent ineffectiveness of policy 
interventions to address chronic regional problems, a large battery of new 
concepts has been developed. Since the early 1990s the relevant literature has 
seen the emergence of concepts such as ‘indigenous growth’, ‘learning regions’ 
and, more recently, ‘city-regions’. Theories of indigenous growth aim at 
enhancing endogenous potentials, by identifying local competitive advantages, 
seeking to exploit local resources and create synergies among local actors 
(creating industries and markets), and helping regions to develop their own 
economic profile and relevant ‘niche’ specialisations. The concept of ‘learning 
regions’ puts more emphasis on the social role of education and human capital, 
on the connections between knowledge production and business activity (e.g., 
through university hubs), and on the role of information and communication 
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technologies, R&D and innovation – and thus of knowledge diffusion, 
knowledge accessibility and knowledge-sharing networks, which help 
transform abstract knowledge into locally relevant learning.  
More recently, largely under the auspices of the British government, the 
concepts of Core Cities and City-Regions have developed and gain increasing 
currency in the literature (Parkinson et al, 2004). This represents a shift away 
from the singular attention on knowledge and learning towards a wider 
emphasis on issues of functional connectivity. A key objective here is the 
organic connection between core cities (i.e., cities that possess sufficient 
competitive advantages that can support their function as growth poles) and 
their hinterlands. This is believed to help with the addressing of demand and 
supply shortages at the very local level by exploiting complementarities and 
market size / potentials across urban areas. In this sense, city-regions 
encompass whole micro-systems of urban hierarchies and aim at identifying, 
strengthening and utilising economic complementarities across diverse and 
heterogeneous localities. As we argue below, this links directly to the concept 
of new (sub-national) regionalism, which has emerged around the same period. 
It also relates, however, to more relational concepts of local economic 
development, such as the concepts of local identity and branding. 
Key role in these approaches plays the psyche of each individual locality, the 
extent to which it can appreciate, connect with, and promote its distinctive 
features (Beer et al, 2003; English Heritage, 2005). Consequently, the 
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development of a regional identity becomes central: a sense of attachment and 
belonging to one’s place and to its historical characteristics and idiosyncrasies. 
This in turn requires the strengthening of local networks and civic participation, 
which thus help with enhancing the sense of citizenship (and thus of 
belonging), but also the formation of actual civic-business links. But it also 
requires the identification, development and branding of local trademarks, as 
well as enhancing and emphasising cultural and historical characteristics 
(heritage), which can subsequently be exploited by such links. Of course, the 
role of social capital is crucial here (Raagmaa, 2001), as this is essential for 
building social networks, both within (bonding) and across (bridging) groups of 
social actors. At the policy level, this requires at least some degree of 
devolution of power – and perhaps fiscal decentralisation – so that local 
governments and stakeholders can be empowered and local resources can be 
mobilised while subjected to a ‘locally-owned’ decision-making process.  
Two broad streams of policy action connect these concepts of local economic 
(and social) development. On the one hand are those that derive from recent 
research in urban economics and economic geography, relating to Buzz Cities 
(Storper and Venables, 2004), Resurgent Cities (Turok and Mykhnenko, 2008), 
the Creative Class (Florida, 2002), etc. These approaches identify the role and 
responsibility of policy, as well as of local actors, for turning disadvantages 
into local trademarks (e.g., turning traffic congestion into a congestion charge!) 
and thus developing area ‘brand names’ and local identities, as well as for 
creating critical masses of interaction – both business and cultural – as a means 
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to enhancing and exploiting agglomeration (urbanisation-localisation) 
economies at the urban and regional scales. On the other hand stand those 
approaches deriving from the new spatial planning literature on polycentricism 
(CPS, 1999; ESPON, 2005 – see also Meijers and Sandberg, 2008). Here, 
development is seen explicitly as a spatial process – happening both in and 
across places – and thus necessitating the development of networks of areas 
that are linked through economic, social and physical activity and encompass 
the trans-national, national as well as regional / local levels. A primacy of the 
core urban areas is identified, although these networks are mainly of non-
hierarchical nature, based on functional synergies than on simple vertical 
linkages. The emphasis is on turning intra-region competition (as well as extra-
regional antagonisms) into a knowledge-sharing collaborative framework of 
relations, which can enhance territorial cohesion and economic development.  
This array of concepts and policy prescriptions can be summarised well under 
the overarching thesis of ‘new regionalism’.3 Following Wallis (2002), new 
regionalism can be defined as a broad developmental strategy that emphasises 
the centrality of place, of internal social relations and networks, and of 
functional external links (multi-polarity) for the promotion of even and 
                                                 
3
 It has to be noted however that this ‘synthetic’ interpretation of the concept of ‘new regionalism’ has 
already attracted some notable criticism in the literature (see Hadjimichalis, 2006 and Lagendijk, 
2007). Specifically, a number of well-intentioned reservations have been expressed about the linking of 
concepts and approaches with fundamentally different methodological and epistemological origins 
under this term – and more specifically about the opening-up of the original ‘new regionalism’ concept 
(which has its origins to critical geography) to approaches originating from the neoclassical / 
equilibrium tradition. We are sympathetic to these critiques but we feel that in the context of the 
problem that we are addressing in this paper the amalgamation of the various literatures on local 
economic development and spatial cohesion under the concept of new regionalism is particularly 
productive. We believe this is evident in the discussion of the relevance of new regionalism for the 
Balkans, which follows in the next section.   
  17 
cohesive development across space. The successful implementation of this 
strategy involves a set of necessary conditions that have to be observed, or 
created. These include (a) visioning and leadership by the local actors and 
administrations, (b) benchmarking for the attainment of clearly specified 
targets, (c) civic participation for the creation of social networks and the 
utilisation and enhancement of local social capital, (d) a conscious adherence to 
processes of consensus-building and reconciliation, and (e) administrative 
decentralisation with devolution of power. A key characteristic of this strategy 
is the emphasis on governance versus government, on processes versus 
structures and on organic collaboration versus superficial coordination between 
authorities and actors. This is in effect a bottom-up approach to local 
development which sees regional economies and localities as open systems 
(rather than as closed self-contained entities) and thus aims at local 
empowerment at the expense of central control and at the establishment of trust 
at the expense of formal accountability. Learning, functional linkages, the 
branding of local distinctiveness and the development of local comparative 
advantages can all be strengthened and best served with this approach. It is an 
approach that goes beyond the simple (and largely problematic) claims for 
redistribution-based approaches to regional development, where the centre (or 
some other external actor) has the overall responsibility for stimulating local 
growth, and instead emphasises the indigenous development of economic 
potentials not in isolation for each locality but in collaboration with the wider 
regional system to which it belongs (or to which it can be made to belong). In 
  18 
the next section we examine to what extent such an approach to local economic 
development can be applied in the Balkan context. 
 
4. Local regionalism for the Balkans 
Although it is not always explicitly appreciated, local economic development in 
the Balkans over the last twenty years, if not earlier, has followed the 
traditional model of externally-stimulated redistribution, either in the form of 
direct state interventions of a regional character or in the form of regional funds 
originating from the EU. In many respects the process of assisting regional 
development has been a mere replication of the policy model for national 
development, namely the development of domestic infrastructures (human and 
physical) and the channelling of resources into the most needy (or, more often, 
more profitable) sectors and regions. As we saw earlier, this was in many 
respects a natural consequence of the internal deficiencies and the external 
constraints that have characterised the Balkans at least since the beginning of 
transition: on the one hand weak domestic capacities, increasing and resurging 
local antagonisms, and a problematic relationship between the central 
administrations and the local authorities; and on the other hand an almost 
uncritical emphasis on European adaptation, internationalisation and fast (but 
uneven) convergence to the European core.   
The spatial and social polarisation and widening economic disparities that have 
been observed in the Balkans, as in all other European transition countries, over 
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the last two decades show, if nothing else, the limitations of this developmental 
model in securing balanced and thus sustainable and equitable growth. 
Consequently, new concepts and models for local economic development have 
started infiltrating policy circles in the region thus influencing policy design at 
both the local and regional levels. In this context, as an example, under the 
auspices of the EU, the concept of polycentric development has recently been 
applied in countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, while it is also gaining 
currency in the Western Balkans.  
Despite the positive potential of this approach, we see this as a partly 
problematic development given the relative lack of discussion and 
understanding about how well such new models fit the Balkan spatial context 
of local development needs and about how such models should be translated 
and applied in this context. We offer a preliminary examination of this in what 
follows. We do so by juxtaposing what we see as some key dimensions of 
socio-spatial infrastructure against the main elements of the new spatial theory 
– and examining the deficiencies and peculiarities characterising the Balkans 
with regards to these. Among the they key policy elements, as mentioned 
previously, we identify those of (a) Vision, leadership and participation, (b) 
Trust and empowerment, (c) Management of local development as an open and 
dynamic process, and (d) Functional and financial independence. Along the 
critical dimensions of socio-spatial infrastructure we identify the following: (a) 
Civil societies, (b) Local governments, (c) Economic and administrative 
connectivity, and (d) Structures and Infrastructures.  
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Table 1 Balkan deficiencies and new spatial policies 
 
Civil 
societies 
Local 
governments 
Connectivity (Infra-) 
structures 
Vision 
-Immature; 
partisan 
representation; 
interests linked 
to elites & 
clientelism 
-Lack of admin 
capacities/resources 
-Undemocratic elites 
and lack of ‘own 
initiative’ culture 
-Sub-ordination to 
national planning 
-Inability to ‘think 
big’ and ‘think 
bold / positive’ 
-Weak extent & 
appreciation of 
synergies and 
complementarities 
-Weak comparative 
advantages and 
human resources 
-Urgent priorities 
(‘roads’) limit 
bolder vision  
Involvement 
-Weak social 
capital 
(bonding v 
bridging) and 
civic networks 
-Suspicion against 
central / local govt 
-Control over policy  
-Dependency on 
central govt for 
priorities/funding 
-Weak linkages 
b/w hinterlands & 
centres  
-Hierarchical 
administrative 
structures 
-Weak economies 
=> competition & 
singular objectives  
-Emphasis on 
infrastructure  
Openness 
-Inward-looking; 
weak civic 
networks; lack 
of trust; 
competition; 
localism 
-Local antagonisms 
-Zero-sum-game 
culture 
-Historical role of 
central govt in setting 
agendas / policies 
-Weak linkages 
across regions / 
urban centres  
-Hierarchical 
admin systems  
-Dualism limits 
econ synergies  
-De-industr/tion => 
‘creativity’ a 
competitive game 
Independence 
-Limited local 
financial 
resources 
-Not mature 
enough to 
develop 
innovative 
strategies 
-Devolution & EU 
co-financing limit 
functional 
independence 
-Functional 
independence also 
hindered by lack of 
capacities/knowledge 
-Lack of economic 
linkages implies 
lack of synergies / 
incentives for 
financial 
collaboration 
among local 
administrations 
-Weak economies 
=> low tax-bases 
=> low local 
service provision 
=> dependence on 
nat’l investment 
and redistribution  
 
Following from the discussion of section 2, we argue that the Balkan economic 
space presents some key weaknesses across all of these dimensions: concerning 
the role of civil society, the region is characterised by a lack of trust and social 
entrepreneurship; similarly, concerning local governments, the region is 
characterised by a lack of financing and relevant resources and capacities; in 
terms of connectivity, as we have already discussed, the regional economy 
suffers from weak spillovers, segmented micro- and macro-geographies and 
spatial polarisation, while the regional administrations suffer similarly from a 
segmentation across the levels of policy-making and from counter-productive 
local antagonisms and competition; finally, socio-economic structures are also 
deficient due to low human capital, low domestic demand and the process of 
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de-industrialisation, while physical and social infrastructures are also deficient 
not least due to the low levels of economic development. But how do these 
deficiencies limit the applicability of the new concepts on regionalism and local 
economic development? We consider this in the reminder of this section. Table 
1 presents this in a schematic form. 
Vision and leadership. As mentioned earlier, a key element of the new 
regionalist developmental model concerns the establishment of a clear vision 
and a strategy that is based on leadership and consensus-building. Naturally 
this concerns all dimensions of the local socio-spatial infrastructure, namely the 
civil society and the local government as well as the local and regional 
(infra)structures and connectivity. Civil societies in the Balkans, however, are 
characterised by fragmentation and low levels of maturity or development. 
Social capital is weak and more often than not of the bonding type, relating to 
narrow interest representation and partisanship. This of course links to wider 
problems and pathologies of the region such as the dominance of financial or 
other elites in the social net and the extensive presence of corruption, cronyism 
and clientelism, both in the formal sphere (government) and in the informal 
economy. On the other hand, local governments lack the administrative and 
technical capacities to inspire and manage a local vision. This is not only due to 
the lack of resources or the actual subordination of regional policy to national 
planning and objectives but, importantly, also due to the region’s past and more 
recent history of undemocratic elite-dominated administrations that has resulted 
in a deep-rooted culture of aversion against one’s ‘own-initiative’. In this sense, 
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allocating additional financial resources or restoring democratic representation 
and self-governance at the local level is, strictly speaking, not sufficient to 
allow the emergence of local leadership and vision. In addition to these, the 
development of leadership and vision is also hindered by the very weak 
economic and administrative connectivity that characterises the Balkan 
economic space as well as by the weak social and physical infrastructures. The 
lack of actual synergies and complementarities across the local economies and 
the limited extent of comparative and competitive advantages – as well as the 
inability, at least partly, to appreciate the existing ones – hampers the 
administration’s ability to ‘think big’ and thus also to ‘think bold’ or ‘think 
positive’: local administrations and social actors cannot connect either with 
their localities or with one another. To the extent that they are willing to do so, 
the urgency of some local problems (e.g., for road-building) limits the 
development of a bolder vision (e.g., for ‘creativity’ and ‘local branding’).  
Involvement, participation and trust. Weak social capital, especially of the 
bridging type, also hinders the development of civic networks and thus of 
participation and trust. A chronic antipathy and suspicion towards both central 
and local government (representing state control and elites-based corruption, 
respectively) is also playing a role here. The involvement of relevant actors in 
the design of a broader developmental initiative is thus also obscured. 
Participation, however, is also obscured by existing attitudes, not only towards, 
but also by local governments. These include a culture of dependency on the 
central administration for the provision of funding as well as for the prioritising 
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of policy initiatives (partly linked to the role of party politics) and an almost 
path-dependent need to insulate policy design and implementation from the 
immediate influence of ‘the public’. While the former only tentatively allows 
the central administration to occupy the space that should be filled by local 
actors, the latter directly blocks local actors from obtaining a more 
participatory approach. On top of this, the weak linkages between centres and 
hinterlands (economic connectivity) discourage the equitable participation of 
all relevant actors while the hierarchical administrative structures 
(administrative connectivity) limits the extent of horizontal cooperation across 
actors and organisations (e.g., between Regional Development Agencies and 
local administrations). The role of (infra)structures is also particularly 
important here. Low levels of development (structures) and the unavoidable 
emphasis on physical investment (infrastructures) imply a narrow structure of 
interests, weak structures of returns and thus fewer investment opportunities. In 
this context, rent-capturing becomes an optimal strategy, thus leading to direct 
competition between various elites and interest groups, while local 
administrations are pushed towards the pursuit of singular objectives (e.g., to 
attract FDI), thus also engaging in direct competition with other localities. Both 
developments result in exclusion and mistrust and hinder the wider 
participation of the local communities in the development project of the region.  
Openness and collaboration. As mentioned earlier, the contemporary 
approaches to local economic development, here bundled together under the 
term ‘new regionalism’, place increased emphasis on the management of local 
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development as an open and dynamic process, which requires the exploitation 
of synergies and the support of collaboration not only inside the developing 
region but also between such regions across the national and trans-national 
economic space. In the Balkans, civil societies are only to a limited extent 
geared to perform this function. At large, civil societies are inward-looking and 
based on weak civic networks. There is a general lack of trust and a culture of 
competition and localism, sometimes even based on ethnic or somehow 
perceived historical lines. Thus, collaboration across the national, let alone 
trans-national, space is limited. Local governments suffer also from similar 
antagonisms. In many respects a culture of inter-municipal competition can be 
observed, reflecting to some extent the culture of localism and mistrust 
mentioned above but also the view of the development process as a zero-sum-
game – where winners are created at the expense of losers.4 Moreover, the 
over-reliance on the central administration, with its historical role in setting 
agendas and policies, also hinders the direct interaction between local 
administrations and thus the exchange of ideas and the identification of 
common needs and common or synergic competencies. Such interactions are 
further limited by the weak economic linkages that exist across regions and 
across urban centres (economic connectivity), which is at least partly the result 
of duality and polarisation (structures): lack of interactions and economic 
dependencies at this level imply a lack of common interests and objectives and 
thus fewer incentives for dialogue and the exploration of shared interests or 
                                                 
4
 Strangely enough, the low levels of development and the low potentials (see point above about weak 
structures of returns and the resulting incentives to rent-seeking) make this attitude seem reasonable. 
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responses to common challenges. On top of this, the urgency of the problems of 
restructuring (de-industrialisation, traditional agricultural production in the less 
populated areas, etc) creates a competitive environment for a ‘race to 
creativity’: as places strive to get out of their relative economic backwardness, 
sharing ideas and resources may appear as sharing, and thus diluting, one’s 
own competitive advantages. This again is a view of development as a zero-
sum-game – which however in the short-run may not be too inaccurate a 
description of reality. Similar is the case with regard to the development of 
physical infrastructure: the almost singular emphasis on infrastructure 
investment increases the competition for it and thus also its cost – and lowers 
its returns (e.g., lower tax revenues due to more generous financial incentives 
to potential investors).  
Functional and financial independence. The issue of tax revenues is 
important, because much of the very idea of new regionalism is based on the 
premise that localities have both the functional and the financial independence 
to engage in the development and branding of their own distinctive features and 
comparative advantages as well as in the exploitation of synergies with similar 
or neighbouring localities. Local administrations in the Balkans, however, face 
invariably acute difficulties to finance such projects. On the one hand, the 
process of financial devolution that has taken place in many Balkan countries, 
partly following EU conditionality, as well as the EU-inspired model of co-
financing that they have adopted, limits significantly their functional 
independence and leads to notable divergences across regions with respect to 
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their ability to generate tax revenues and finance local development initiatives. 
These divergences, coupled with the inherent weaknesses in terms of 
knowledge and resource management (administrative and technical capacities), 
are then responsible for the development of antagonistic non-cooperative 
attitudes. Civil societies are largely unable to fill the vacuum created by the 
local administrations, as they have limited ability to mobilise financial 
resources internally and lack the knowledge and attitudes (e.g., 
entrepreneurship) to devise innovative strategies for local economic 
development. Again, the weak economic connectivity of most parts of the 
Balkan economic space, both within and across the national borders, plays a 
negative role as the lack of crucial economic linkages and spillovers implies 
lack of synergies and incentives for financial collaboration, across localities, 
among local administrations, businesses, and other stakeholders. These 
problems interact strongly with the structural problem of relative 
underdevelopment. Low tax revenues lead to low levels of local service 
provision, making the concerned localities less attractive (and thus less suitable 
as potential partners for other neighbouring localities) and at the same time 
increase their dependence on national investment and redistribution 
mechanisms – thus creating a vicious circle of prioritising on traditional forms 
of regional development at the expense of the more relational and collaborative 
forms discussed here – especially as the mere scale of infrastructural needs at 
the local level is such that cannot be addressed by sole reliance on the local 
resources.  
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It follows from the above that the application to the Balkan context of concepts 
and development tools such as those falling under the umbrella term of ‘new 
regionalism’ – or of particular facets of this, such as polycentricism, city-
regions, resurgent cities, etc – faces significant constraints that are too big to be 
overlooked. Although the over-reliance on traditional methods of regional 
development, namely redistribution and external assistance, may not be able to 
resolve the main regional problems and needs, the superficial implementation 
of contemporary developmental models without the careful examination of the 
domestic context and its limitations may have even more negative effects – 
possibly exacerbating more the problems of polarisation, underdevelopment 
and dependence described earlier. This does not imply, however, that the 
application of such concepts should be seen as prohibitive. We reflect on this 
observation in the concluding section. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The transition process that started in the Balkans some twenty years ago, and 
the European association process to which it has been inexorably connected, 
has led, for better or worse, to a radical transformation of the Balkan economic 
space at all levels: local, regional, national and trans-national. Amongst the 
other effects that this have had, was the emergence of new and acute socio-
economic dichotomies, largely taking the form of a core-periphery model of 
development (polarisation), but also exhibiting other negative features such as 
  28 
persistent underdevelopment, peripherality-rurality and above all economic 
dependence.  
Given the rather natural prioritising on national growth and the European 
perspective (as well as on state building), in many cases such problems went 
unobserved for years and became well embedded in the new economies. The 
policy response, in adherence to the EU principles of regional policy, was the 
development of a dual system of administrative decentralisation, in most cases 
without a corresponding process of financial decentralisation, and of top-down 
economic assistance, which often – but not always – had a redistributive 
character (Monastiriotis, 2008a). This policy response has failed to produce the 
anticipated results. This may be due to the scale of the problems that the policy 
sought to address (i.e., extent of disparity). It is at least equally possible, 
however, that the inability to contain – not to mention reverse – the increasing 
inequality and polarisation in the region is due to an inherent inconsistency 
between the main objectives of policy. In a context of accelerated growth and 
catch-up convergence, regional disparities are naturally amplified. Servicing 
the objective of regional convergence hits upon the objective of establishing 
‘national champions’ and strongly localised agglomerations. This inconsistency 
creates two logical options for the backward regions of the Balkans. One is a 
‘wait and see’ strategy, largely consistent with a neoclassical convergence 
story, which justifies the widening of disparities at present in return of faster 
growth (and regional convergence) in the future. The other derives from a view 
that sees economic disparity and polarisation more critically and anticipates a 
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cumulative causation process that has to be tackled as early and as fully as 
possible. This view calls then for a different developmental model, which will 
be able to mobilise local resources, create synergies across localities, and 
develop comparative and competitive advantages that can generate positive net 
returns to the local economies. Such is the strategy advocated by the new 
regionalist thesis.  
Although new regionalism, at least in the interpretation used here, is a 
relatively new concept that has not been openly discussed as a potential local 
development strategy for the Balkans, elements or concepts similar or 
compatible to new regionalism, such as polycentricism, are slowly but steadily 
entering the policy and academic debates in the region. Polycentric 
development models are already being implemented in the eastern part of the 
Balkans and similar developments can soon be expected in the countries of the 
Western Balkans that are closer to EU accession. In light of this, we feel that a 
careful consideration of the ‘fit’ of such concepts to the Balkan context, of their 
potential benefits and their possible shortcomings, is necessary in order to set-
out the discussion for the future development of the local and regional 
economies across the region. In this paper we offer a preliminary discussion 
along these lines, by sketching out a simple model that juxtaposes the key 
elements of the new regionalist strategy with the key dimensions of the socio-
spatial infrastructure that is called to support and implement this strategy – 
such as civil society, local administrations, economic structures and 
infrastructures, etc.  
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Our analysis proposes a series of problems in the application of the new 
regionalist strategy in the Balkan context. Problems of economic connectivity 
and development, local antagonisms, an under-developed civil society, and 
many more, all make it particularly difficult to envision the deployment of a 
coherent developmental model, across the region or in any single Balkan 
country, that will be based on the premises of local leadership, participation, 
openness, and independence. This, nevertheless, does not mean that the region 
should revert to traditional models of regional development and abandon 
uncritically any attempts for the deployment of local development strategies 
consistent with the concepts and tools of the contemporary literature. Instead, 
we see the preliminary examination that we offer here as a first attempt to 
identify the key weaknesses that policy (and polity) should address in order to 
promote such a contemporary developmental strategy. Amongst the many 
factors that we identify here, we believe that the issue of connectivity and 
(intra-regional) openness, both economic and administrative, is of elevated 
importance. Of course, upgrading local administrative capacities and 
strengthening the civil society is a necessary sine-qua-non for local and 
regional development. But while a necessary condition, this is not by itself a 
sufficient condition for attaining the objectives of sustainable and cohesive 
development.  
We have argued elsewhere (Monastiriotis, 2008b; Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 
2008) that national development in the Balkans cannot be achieved without a 
true and well-designed process of regional cooperation that will be based on an 
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explicit development plan for the whole of the region. We extend our argument 
here by maintaining that to achieve sustainable and equitable sub-national 
development the region needs a specific spatial development plan that will be 
the product of genuine and deep cooperation across the countries of the region 
at all levels: local, regional, and national. The countries in the region are too 
weak and too much geared towards the objective of EU accession to be able to 
support by themselves, and in isolation, the objective of regional convergence. 
Neither traditional regional policies for diffusing national development, nor 
indigenous processes for mobilising local development, are sufficient in this 
context. Instead, spatial cohesion and local economic development will have to 
come from the exploitation of trans-national regionalism as a tool for 
mobilising local as well as national economic development. Such a process 
exists (SEE regional cooperation) and is in line with the region’s European 
perspective. What is left is the transformation of this process into an explicit 
Balkan Development Strategy, which will include a spatial development plan 
covering both the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. We believe that this can act 
as a means to promote a wider strategy and vision for the region – which will 
act as a seed for the promotion of similar local visions and leaderships. It will 
utilise the existing fora of regional cooperation to engage local and regional 
actors and promote the objective of local and regional development as a central 
axis in the pursuit of modernisation and catch-up convergence. It will allow the 
countries in the region to deploy polycentric development as a trans-national 
strategy that will truly integrate the Balkan economic space. It will create ‘local 
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identities’ – some of them shared, some of them uniquely distinctive – around 
the main urban hubs in a way that allows the creation of competitive city-
regions – rather than of competing metropoles. It will thus enhance the existing 
metropolitan functions and create new complementary ones. It will finally help 
build inter-communal trust through cross-national cooperation.  
A process of supra-national new regionalism is already established in the 
Balkans. Its sub-regional counterpart is still in its infancy – if at all with us. The 
appreciation of the problems of relative underdevelopment, socio-economic 
disparity and spatial polarisation facing the localities of the region calls 
urgently, we believe, for the amalgamation of the two processes into a holistic 
developmental strategy for the region that will encompass all administrative 
levels and geographical scales. Devising an integrated local development 
strategy for the region will enhance the supra-national process of regional 
cooperation; while the re-direction of the latter towards servicing long-run 
regional objectives, besides the issue of EU accession, will be key for 
providing the local and national economies of the region with the tools and 
competencies to escape their economic backwardness and dependence. 
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